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Abstract—The Android operating system changed its security-
and privacy-related permission model recently, offering its users
the ability to control resources that applications are allowed to
access on their devices. This major change to the traditional
coarse-grained permission system was anticipated for a long
time by privacy-aware users. This paper presents the first study
that analyzes Android users’ adaptation to the fine-grained
runtime permission model, regarding their security and privacy
controls. We gathered anonymous data from 50 participants who
downloaded our application and answered questions related to
the new permission model. The results indicate that the majority
of users prefer the new model. We also collected data that
demonstrate users’ security controls at the given time. Our
analysis shows that individuals make consistent choices regarding
the resources they allow to various applications to access.
I. INTRODUCTION
The release of the sixth Android version, during summer
2015, introduced a major change at the permission system.
Prior versions presented to the user a message at installation
time, listing the resources that applications were utilizing.
The users after reviewing the requested permissions (presented
as groups, e.g. Contacts) had the choice to accept or deny
the installation. This binary model (accept-reject) has been
criticized at the past as being ineffective to provide meaningful
information about the way the application to be installed will
affect user’s privacy [1], [2]. It also limits the ability of users
to control applications’ access to their private data.
The new permission model is based on the principle of
least privilege and assumes that applications will be able to
function at a basic level, even if the users do not provide
access to resources that might affect their privacy. According
to the official documentation for Android Developers1, there
are two basic categories of permissions; normal and dan-
gerous. The system automatically grants access to resources
that applications requested via normal permissions, because
these actions are considered to be of low risk. For example,
as the documentation notes, setting the time zone requires
a normal permission. The risks arising from this action for
users’ privacy (or for the operation of other applications) are
considered minimal. On the other hand, when an application
needs to access data related to users’ private information,
or data stored on the device, the associated permission with
this action is considered as dangerous. For example, if an
1http://bit.ly/2d4AdGH
application requests access to the user’s calendar, it introduces
high risks to user’s privacy. Hence, applications designed to
function properly under the new permission model, need to
request user’s permission during runtime, in order to access
sensitive information. It lies with the users’ discretion if they
will accept or deny access to sensitive resources. Additionally,
under the runtime permission model, Android users are able
to revoke access to resources via the Settings application.
In this paper we present the results of a study about
users’ adaptation to the Android runtime permission model.
We developed and distributed an application at the official
Android marketplace (Google Play) to collect anonymous
data related to the permissions that were granted (or denied)
by users at that time (‘Permissions snapshots’). The aim of
the study is to examine users’ perceptions of the provided
security and privacy, and at the same time, to investigate how
Marshmallow users adapted to the new permission model. To
our knowledge, this is the first work that studies and presents
trends associated to the security and privacy preferences of
Android Marshmallow users. Our contributions are as follows:
a) We collected data from 50 participants2, which demonstrate
that they adopted positively the runtime permission model. b)
We present a comparative view of users’ privacy settings and
other trends associated to the use of popular social media.
c) We highlight that our participants presented a consistent
behavior related to the resources they allow to be accessed by
various applications.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous work showcased privacy- and security-related
concerns associated with Android’s install-time permission
system, such as the proliferation of over-privileged applica-
tions [3]. Studies on user-defined security controls on mobile
devices showed that users (on average) have to make over
a hundred permission decisions per device [4]. In addition,
researchers demonstrated than users are unaware of the number
(or the context) of permissions they granted to applications at
the past [5].
A recent paper by Wijesekera et al. [6] showed that during a
study, at least 80% of the participants indicated that they would
2The anonymized dataset is available online at the following address:
http://dx.doi.org/10.14324/000.ds.1520825/
978-1-5090-1138-4/16/$31.00 c©2016 IEEE 2016 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)
prevent at least one permission request of an experimental
application if they were aware of its purpose and functionality.
The participants also stated that they would block over a third
of permission requests if they had this choice. However, other
studies highlighted that most of the users do not pay atten-
tion to system messages related to permission requests [7].
Additionally, researchers demonstrated that users were often
surprised by the ability of applications to collect personal data
in the background and share data with third parties [8]. Adver-
tising libraries for example have been consistently examined
for data exposure and leakages; a recent study revealed a
trend in advertising networks to become more aggressive in
collecting reachable user data [9].
In order to protect mobile devices from unlimited data
sharing, several systems have been proposed. Some approaches
focus on location services [10], offering its users the ability
to adjust location accuracy when using location-based applica-
tions. At the same time, on-device or service-based obfuscation
techniques have been advised as a methodology to maintain
users’ privacy [11]. Such schemes according to [12], that uti-
lize abstract location descriptions, may cause location sharing
to increase. Beresford et al. [13] presented their system, named
MockDroid, which essentially feeds ‘empty’ resources to apps
that require access to sensitive data. Another data protection
mechanism that relies on obfuscation is AppFence [14]; this
system substitutes shadow data in place of data that the
user wants to keep private. In addition, there exist methods
based on crowdsourcing, which aim to utilize contributors’
protection decisions in order to provide application specific
privacy recommendations for iOS devices [15]. Note that fine-
grained permissions were introduced earlier, when the iOS 6
was launched.
Our study assesses security settings found on devices run-
ning the Marshmallow version. In this work we assume that
participants do not share their devices with other people and
we intent to highlight behavioral patterns related to their
perceptions of security.
III. METHODOLOGY
We developed an application which was introduced as a
survey instrument (‘Permissions Snapshot’). It was published
at the Google Play store, following the example of other recent
research works [4], [16]. ‘Permissions Snapshot’ makes use
of the PackageManager class (Android SDK) to get the per-
missions that were granted from the system to each installed
application on the device. Participants had to download the
application on their devices to complete the survey. In order to
proceed with this study (and before publishing the application
to Google Play) we obtained approval from the UCL Research
Ethics Committee (Project ID Number: 8945/001).
A. Survey Design
The application targets Android Marshmallow users (SDK
23+) and cannot be installed on devices that run an older
version of the operating system. Thus, collected data came
from participants who were familiar with the sixth Android
version (Marshmallow). The application does not collect any
personal information apart from the package names of the
installed applications and the requested permissions. In order
to avoid duplicate entries from participants, the application
requests from the system to get the ANDROID_ID (which is
a number granted by the system, uniquely distinguishing de-
vices). Our application returns a hashed value of this number,
which can be used from us to maintain users’ anonymity and,
at the same time, identify possible duplicate entries.
When the users launch the application they have to read the
‘Information Sheet’ which describes the aim of the study and
the steps that will follow. The participants must click a check
box to indicate they give their consent and start the survey. The
users are always informed about the current and the next step
of the process. When the user’s consent is given, the appli-
cation receives information about the permissions the system
granted (or not) for each installed application at the specific
(current) time. Our application utilizes the PackageManager
class receiving information via its getPackageInfo public
method. This procedure takes usually less than a second on a
contemporary device. Then the survey starts, gathering basic
demographic data. The next steps require the participants to
answer six multiple choice questions (by clicking on radio
buttons). Each question is presented on a single activity
and the user has to click the ‘Next’ button to view the next
question. All questions had predefined answers in order to
make analysis easier for us and distinguish participants who
were just skipping questions by clicking the ‘Next’ button.
When the six questions are answered, the user sends the
responses (along with the demographic and the permissions
data) to our server by clicking a button. Finally, the application
shows to the participant a short tutorial that discusses the
changes at the permission model.
These six questions were aiming to show if our participants
had noticed the changes at the Android permission model and
if these changes caused security fatigue [17] to them. The
questions are summarized as follows: 1) How long have you
been using the Android Marshmallow operating system? 2)
Have you noticed any changes at the current app permission
model? 3) Do you think that now you have more control on
the personal data you share? 4) “I can invoke or grant any
app permissions anytime from the Settings app of my device.”
Correct, Wrong, I Don’t Know. 5) “I believe that the new
runtime permission model is irritating because it asks me too
many questions during running time.” Agree, Disagree, I Don’t
Know. 6) Do you prefer the new permission model (runtime
permission requests) or the old model?
B. Permission Data Acquisition
Settings for granted permissions for each application on
Android devices can be found using the Settings appli-
cation: Settings → Apps → (application) → Permissions.
Users are able to grant, deny or revoke permissions to spe-
cific groups. Using the flag GET_PERMISSIONS when call-
ing the getPackageInfo method of the PackageManager,
we can get information about the status of each permis-
sion for every application (requestedPermissions and
requestedPermissionsFlags). Our application does not
gather information about system’s applications. After exper-
imenting with these settings we concluded that for each
requested permission by the application, the system returns
public arrays of Strings and ints denoting the current
permission settings on the device. In our log files we denoted
a granted permission with 3 and a denied permission by 1.
According to the Android Developers documentation3, the
first time an application requests to access sensitive re-
sources (e.g. the SMS list, using for example the permission
READ_SMS), it displays a dialogue message to the users to get
explicitly their permission to do so. However, if users allowed
at the past access to a single permission (e.g. READ_SMS),
then anytime the application requests another permission from
the same group (e.g. SEND_SMS), the system will immedi-
ately grant this permission. Thus, during analysis we took
this fact into account to reconstruct the acquired permission
settings for each application (and each permission group).
For example, if for the package org.telegram.messenger
(the ‘Telegram’ application) the PackageManager returned
“android.permission.READ_CONTACTS, 1” (i.e. denied)
and “android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS, 3” (i.e.
granted), this means that the application was granted permis-
sion to access the ‘Contacts’ group.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We publicized the study at university mailing lists, social
media and forums for a period of one month (June - July
2016) and we got responses from 50 participants. No prizes
or other raffles were offered at this campaign. We should note
that during this period, the Android Developers Dashboards4
reported that only 10% (approximately) of the Android users
that visited the Google Play Store were running the Marsh-
mallow version on their devices.
Among the 50 respondents, 3 Android Marshmallow users
provided the predefined answers of the questionnaire, hence
their demographic data and their answers were excluded
from the presented results. However, their device data were
included in the analysis, because they could not somehow be
manipulated or falsified from these users; these are device-
dependent data. Additionally, although we got permission data
from one participant, the file that was sent to us from the
specific device did not contain demographic data. Finally, data
sent by one participant (No 24) contained only the permission
data of our application and the responses to the six questions;
these responses were also taken into account during analysis.
A. Demographics and Questionnaire
46 responses were included at the demographic data and
questionnaire analysis. 85% of the participants were males and
15% were females. Half of the users were between 18 to 30
years of age (52%), 37% were 31 to 46 years old, 9% were
between 47 and 65 years old and 2% were above 66 years
3http://bit.ly/2d4AdGH
4http://bit.ly/1kjKifB
old. The majority of the respondents were residents of Europe
(74%); the rest were from America-Canada (17%) and 9% of
the responses were sent from Asia.
According to the responses at the six questions, 52% of
the Marshmallow users in our sample had been using the
Marshmallow version for a period of 0 - 6 months. 30% of
the participants had been using the operating system for 7
- 12 months and 11% claimed they had been using it for
more than a year. The latter might indicate that some of the
respondents were software developers who experimented with
the Developer Previews; these were released on summer 2015.
This is not unreasonable if we take into consideration that we
advertized our application to Google+ Communities related
to Android. The rest participants (7%) clicked the “I Don’t
Know” option. Considering the second question, 89% of the
participants replied that they had noticed the change at the
permission model. 7% said they did not notice any difference
and 4% chose the “I Don’t Know” answer. This finding shows
that our participants were familiar with the change at the
permission model.
The next questions were aiming to assess if users were
satisfied with the security and usability of the new permission
model. At the third question, 65% of the respondents replied
positively; they think that now they have more control as
users on the personal data they share. However, 17% replied
negatively and 17% said “I Don’t Know”. The responses
at question 4 (“I can invoke or grant any app permissions
anytime from the Settings app of my device.”) showcased that
the participants of our study knew how to use the Settings
application. 78% chose “I Agree”, 7% clicked “I Disagree”
and 15% said “I Don’t Know”. Considering the usability of the
model and the security fatigue that might cause, the responses
at the fifth question showed that Marshmallow users were not
overwhelmed by the security dialogue messages the system
produces. The question was presented as “I believe that the
new runtime permission model is irritating because it asks
me too many questions during running time”; 89% of the
participants replied “I Disagree” and only 11% clicked on the
“I Agree” choice.
Finally, participants were asked if they prefer the runtime
permission model or the old one. 78% of them said they
prefer the runtime permission model and 9% said they prefer
the previous model. Also, 13% clicked the “I don’t have any
specific preference” option. The responses at the last question
show that users adapted to the changes the permission model
introduced in a positive fashion.
To conclude, the majority of Android Marshmallow users in
our sample suggested that they think they are able to efficiently
control the data they share using the runtime permissions
model, they are not frustrated by the dialogue messages the
system issues and they prefer the runtime permissions model
against the previous.
B. Permission Data Analysis
We analyzed permission data received from 49 devices.
As discussed previously in Section IV, one device returned
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Fig. 1. Requests to Access Dangerous Permission Groups per Device.
TABLE I
AVERAGE USE OF DANGEROUS PERMISSION GROUPS
Permission Groups Average Use (%) Standard Deviation
CALENDAR 7.34 5.16
CAMERA 30.46 9.36
CONTACTS 58.02 12.78
LOCATION 49.67 12.20
MICROPHONE 21.63 9.37
PHONE 40.56 10.56
SENSORS 0.93 1.19
SMS 16.51 9.23
STORAGE 76.64 7.18
only permission data derived from our application, hence it
was excluded from analysis. The average number of installed
applications per device was approximately 71. The maximum
number of applications found on a single device was 283 and
the minimum was 19. The number of unique applications that
were seen in the collected dataset was 1,983 applications.
Developers must declare permissions that will be re-
quested to the system by their applications in the
AndroidManifest.xml file. This information is made avail-
able to the PackageManager during runtime. Using the
methodology described in Section III-B we gathered the
declared permissions for each application. The average num-
ber of permissions declared in the AndroidManifest.xml
file of each application was approximately 12.39 (standard
deviation = 10.94). The average number of dangerous per-
missions per application was approximately 3.85 (standard
deviation = 3.21). This means that (statistically) 31% of the
declared permissions in the AndroidManifest.xml file of
each application belonged to dangerous permissions groups.
The application com.baidu.appsearch contained 118 per-
missions in its manifest file and 19 of them belonged to
dangerous groups. The application ‘Signal Private Messenger’
(org.thoughtcrime.securesms) declared 20 permissions
that belonged to dangerous permissions groups. These applica-
tions presented the highest number of declared and dangerous
permissions in our dataset, respectively.
C. Permission Groups
As mentioned at Section III-B we grouped the declared
permissions to simulate what users see when they tap on
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Fig. 2. Accessibility (%) of Dangerous Permission Groups per Device.
the Settings application to view the granted permissions per
application. According to the Android Developers documen-
tation, there are 9 groups of dangerous permissions: Calendar,
Camera, Contacts, Location, Microphone, Phone, Sensors,
SMS, Storage. For each device we estimated the average
use of dangerous permissions. To do that we counted how
many permissions from dangerous groups were included in
the manifest files of each application per device. We did not
take into account in this calculation if access was granted to
the groups at the specific time. The results can be seen at
Fig. 1; the majority of installed applications requested access
to the Camera, Contacts, Location, Phone and Storage groups.
TABLE I shows in average the use of dangerous permissions,
derived from their appearance in each device.
Fig. 2 shows the accessibility of permission groups. In
other words, it illustrates which permission groups were ac-
cessible from the installed applications per device. The figure
demonstrates that users tend to preserve a stable behavior
when they set permissions for different applications. However,
this result seems to be skewed by the fact that there existed
numerous applications per device that were not (probably)
updated to serve the new permission model. Thus, applications
like ‘Snapchat’ (during the period our experiments took place)
appeared to have access to all dangerous resources, because
they were not designed (at least at that period) to adhere to the
new model. Such applications can be easily identified if the
user tries to revoke access to resources via the Settings app;
the user will see the message: “This app was designed for an
older version of Android. Denying permission may cause it to
no longer function as intended”. To overcome skewed results
caused by the existence of such applications we present a more
targeted analysis at the rest of this paper.
D. Fine-grained Permissions on Social Media Applications
In this section we present users’ behavioral trends consid-
ering the fine-grained settings on popular social media appli-
cations. We focused our study on 8 popular applications and
instant messengers: (Facebook) Messenger (orca), Facebook
(katana), Whatsapp, Twitter, Skype, Instagram, Linkedin and
Telegram. Telegram was added in the analysis because it is
known for its ‘end-to-end’ encryption capabilities. TABLE II
shows the popularity of these applications in our sample. Note
TABLE II
INSTALLATIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA APPLICATIONS IN OUR SAMPLE
Applications - Packages Installations (approx.) %
com.facebook.orca 37 76
com.whatsapp 32 65
com.twitter.android 31 63
com.facebook.katana 22 45
com.skype.raider 20 41
com.instagram.android 14 29
com.linkedin.android 13 27
org.telegram.messenger 7 14
TABLE III
USERS THAT SELECTIVELY GRANTED PERMISSIONS TO APPLICATIONS
Applications All On (%) All Off (%) Fine-grained (%)
Messenger 24 22 54
Whatsapp 44 0 56
Twitter 23 19 58
Facebook 23 9 68
Skype 35 15 50
Instagram 7 29 64
LinkedIn 38 15 46
Telegram 0 14 86
that Messenger appeared to be more popular in our sample
than the Facebook application itself; this indicates that there
exists a considerable number of users that prefer to use only
the Messenger application.
TABLE III shows the percentage of users that allowed (All
On) or denied (All Off) access to all permission groups or used
fine-grained settings for each app, respectively. According to
this table, on average, approximately 60% of our respon-
dents appeared to selectively grant access to resources when
prompted by social media applications. The high accessibility
levels seen for Telegram might arise from the fact that it offers
end to end encryption, hence users would eventually trust the
application more compared to others.
Fig. 3 presents in a concise graph the percentages of users
that granted permission to dangerous groups per application.
In this graph we only consider participants who selectively
granted (or denied) permissions per application. Thus, we
only consider participants from the “Fine-grained” category
of TABLE III. We can derive that users allow or deny access
to permission groups considering the functionality of each
application. For example, it seems that users happily allow
the LinkedIn application to access their Contact List (100%).
However, applications like Messenger and Facebook demon-
strate lower rates of accessibility to this permission group
(47% and 33%, respectively). Also, users of messaging appli-
cations like Messenger, Whatsapp, Skype and Telegram seem
willing to grant access to the Microphone permission group. At
the same time, Facebook, Twitter, Uber and Instagram present
high numbers of accessibility to Location services. We can also
extract some additional common characteristics in people’s
behavior. For instance, if we focus on the Storage group we
can see that most of the users allow these applications to access
the storage of their devices. Another observation can be made
for the SMS group; in general, users do not allow applications
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Fig. 3. Percentage of Granted Permissions per Application.
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Fig. 4. Common Settings Among Popular Applications per Device.
to access their SMS list with the exception of Whatsapp and
Telegram.
E. Users’ Behavioral Consistency
In the final section of our analysis we are interested to
see if users present a consistent behavior when they are
using different applications on their devices. In other words,
we are evaluating if the same participant follows the same
patterns when using the fine-grained permission system on
a variety of applications on the same device. We identified
the users in our sample that had installed at least three
applications listed at TABLE II. LinkedIn and Telegram were
excluded from the analysis for this section, because the former
application declares access to only 3 dangerous groups and
the latter was installed only on 7 devices. We did not take
into consideration the Calendar permission group, because
it is only used on Facebook’s manifest file. Hence, we are
evaluating similarities to the way users grant or deny access to
specific resources considering at least 3 popular social media
applications installed on the same device.
Behavioral similarity or consistency is defined here as
the quality of preserving similar user behavior when various
applications (at least 3) request access to a specific permission
group. For example, if the user has granted (or denied)
access to the Microphone group to at least 60% of social
media applications (installed on the same device), then this
is considered as a sign of behavioral consistency.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the behavioral consistency (%) for 33
users in our sample. They had installed at least 3 applications
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Fig. 5. Average Behavioral Consistency of Users.
from the popular social media applications list, as discussed
previously in this section. User No 3 for example presented
similarities at the Contacts, Location and Storage groups
settings (83.3%, 66.67%, 66.67%, respectively). Finally, we
gathered the average behavioral consistency per user and the
results can be seen at Fig. 5. The overall average behavior
consistency among the 33 users is 83.26% and the standard
deviation is 10.05. These numbers indicate that users of pop-
ular social media in our sample presented strong similarities,
considering their security settings on different applications.
F. Limitations
Due to the chosen methodology to conduct the survey and
given that we aimed to offer a user-friendly experience to the
participants, we avoided asking extended questions, offering
at the same time a limited number of answers. This strategy
limited participants’ ability to provide very detailed answers.
Further research work related to the usability and acceptance
of the new permission model can verify or disprove our
findings. Also, the anonymous permission data we gathered
cannot describe if the user was asked at some point by an
application to grant access to a group, and whether access
was actually denied to this group.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
To conclude, this paper discussed the results of the first
study that focuses on security perceptions related to the use
of the new runtime permission model. The responses from our
participants indicate that users adapted positively to the new
model. Most of them prefer to use the new system compared to
the previous and they believe they can control more drastically
the sensitive data they share. We also demonstrated that, in
general, one third of the requested permissions in our sample
belonged to dangerous permission groups. Additionally, we
showed that Storage, Contacts, Location, Phone and Camera
were the most requested groups. Considering the accessibility
of particular applications to resources, we highlighted the
persistence of users to allow access to groups that are directly
related to their main functionality (e.g. Camera for Instagram).
Finally, we showed that (in general) users’ behavior is con-
sistent regarding the resources they allow to social media
applications to access. More work needs to be done to assess
users’ trust to specific applications. In the future we also aim
to investigate if the users’ privacy settings and preferences
change by time.
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